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Kaufman: Protecting Subject Children

PROTECTING SUBJECT CHILDREN IN FAMILY COURT AND
BEYOND: THE NECESSITY TO UTILIZE IDENTICAL
CONFIDENTIALITY MEASURES BETWEEN ARTICLE 6
LINCOLN HEARINGS AND ARTICLE 10 LINCOLN HEARINGS
Bradley Kaufman *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Family Reunification is defined as the “process of returning
children in temporary out-of-home care to their families of origin.” 1
Reunification is the ultimate goal and objective sought for families
whose children were removed from the family home. 2 In Custody and
Visitation proceedings (Article 6 of the Family Court Act of New
York) 3, a Family Court judge has jurisdiction and authority to award
custody of the subject children to family members other than the
children’s parents, such as grandparents, if the familial circumstances
warrant such an order. 4 This means parents will temporarily,
sometimes even permanently, be stripped of their custody and
visitation rights over their own children if a judge determines the
arrangement will be in the children’s best interest. 5 Similar orders can
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1 CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, Family Reunification: What the Evidence
Shows 1, 2 (2011), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/familyreunification.pdf.
2 Id. at 2.
3 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 651 (West, Westlaw through L.2017, ch. 1 to 6).
4 Id.
5 Id.
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also be issued in Abuse and Neglect Proceedings (Article 10 of the
Family Court Act of New York) 6, resulting in temporary or permanent
removal of the children from their parents’ homes to be placed in the
custody of another suitable relative, if the placement is in the children’s
best interest. 7 The ultimate goal for families experiencing a removal
scenario in Abuse and Neglect matters is reunification of the family in
the foreseeable future. 8 Generally, federal law in the United States
requires the ultimate goal of family reunification to be achieved within
twelve months of removal of the children from the family residence. 9
The reunification decision is, of course, subject to a best-interest-ofthe-child analysis. 10
The Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 11 (CYFA) from
the Victorian Parliament of Australia 12 provides clear “best-interest
principles” 13 for children. CYFA also offers considerations to be
weighed to further the children’s best interests regarding the
reunification of a family. For example, CYFA provides that “when
determining whether a decision or action is in the best interests of the
child, the need to protect the child from harm, to protect his or her
rights and to promote his or her development . . . must always be
6

§ 1055 (Westlaw).
Id.
8 Id. § 1055 (iii)(C).
9 Stacey M. Saunders-Adams, Reunification and Reentry in Child Welfare: A Systematic
Review and Meta-analysis, 24 NAT’L SYMPOSIUM ON DOCTORAL RESEARCH IN SOC. WORK 1,
1 (2012), https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/ 1811/52994/24_5_saunders-adams_
paper_kb.pdf.
10 § 1055 (Westlaw).
11 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Act No. 96/2005) ch 1 s 10 pt 1.2 div 2 (Austl.)
[hereinafter CYFA].
12 The author decided to use Australia’s “best-interest principles” in this Note because the
CYFA lists a plethora of considerations that the judge must follow when making a decision in
Family Court proceedings. For example, the best-interest principles in the CYFA span
approximately three pages in the Act, which includes subsections one through three, with
subsection three having subsections a through r. See CYFA, supra note 11. All subsections
and sub-subsections contain thorough and specific considerations a judge must follow with
“any other relevant consideration” being the last consideration mentioned. See CYFA, supra
note 11, at para 3r. This list, although illustrative, is not exhaustive, but provides a judge with
a myriad of additional considerations he may not have ordinarily considered if it was not
otherwise explicitly listed. See CYFA, supra note 11, at para 3. By contrast, New York’s bestinterest principles lists approximately eight bullet points of considerations for a judge to
evaluate in making his decision.
Best Interest of the Child, NYCOURTS,
www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/family/bestInterest.shtml (last visited Mar. 7, 2017). Although
not an exhaustive list either, it provides less guidance and significantly fewer factors to
consider from the onset of such a proceeding. Id.
13 CYFA, supra note 11, at ch 1 s 10 pt 1.2 div 2 para 3.
7
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considered.” 14 Additionally, CYFA states that consideration relevant
to the need “to strengthen, preserve and promote positive relationships
between the child and the child’s parent, family members and persons
significant to the child” 15 must be assessed to determine if a decision
or an action will be in the child’s best interest. 16 New York should
adopt principles akin to the Australian principles from the CYFA to
further its goal of promoting and maintaining the children’s best
interest in Family Court matters.
The best interest of the children principle is fully incorporated
in Custody and Visitation (Article 6) proceedings. 17 For instance,
subject children who testify do so in a private in camera setting,
usually in a judge’s chambers, with only the judge, the Attorney for
the Child, and a court reporter present. 18 The transcript of the
testimony is sealed and only accessible by the presiding Family Court
judge and the Appellate judge, upon appeal. 19 This procedure, known
as a “true” Lincoln hearing, protects the children from the potential
trauma of testifying in open court, especially with their parents
present. 20 In addition, the sealing of the transcript ensures full
confidentiality so the sensitive content of the children’s testimony will
not be revealed. 21 These protections are in place to prevent the
possibility of jeopardizing or further jeopardizing a parent, a child, or
a parent-child relationship, which would be contrary to the child’s
best-interest principle.
Abuse and Neglect (Article 10) proceedings, on the other hand,
are not as rigid with respect to confidentiality and the best-interest-ofthe-child protections. 22 Subject children testifying in Article 10
proceedings may testify in a Lincoln hearing setting, with some
caveats, such as needing the consent of all parties to the litigation.23
The attorney for each parent is permitted to be present and ask

14

CYFA, supra note 11, at ch 1 s 10 pt 1.2 div 2 para 2.
CYFA, supra note 11, at ch 1 s 10 pt 1.2 div 2 para 3b.
16 CYFA, supra note 11, at ch 1 s 10 pt 1.2 div. 2 para 3b.
17 Lincoln v. Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d 659, 660 (N.Y. 1969).
18 Id. at 661.
19 CALLAGHAN’S FAMILY COURT LAW & PRACTICE § 4:12 (Westlaw 2016 ed. 2016)
[hereinafter CALLAGHAN’S §4:12].
20 Id.
21 Verry v. Verry, 880 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (3d Dep’t 2009) (quoting Matter of Hrusovsky v.
Benjamin, 710 N.Y.S.2d 198, 201 (3d Dep’t 2000)).
22 CALLAGHAN’ § 4:12, supra note 19.
23 In re Justin C., 903 N.Y.S.2d, 806, 807 (3d Dep’t 2010).
15

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 [2017], Art. 20

1192

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33

questions while the children testify in chambers. 24 The transcript of
the children’s testimony during these proceedings is unsealed and can
be accessed by both parties, eliminating the confidential nature seen in
Article 6 proceedings. 25 These hearings are known as “modified”
Lincoln hearings. 26 A rationale for removing full confidentiality in
these hearings is to protect the parents’ due process rights in abuse and
neglect cases. 27 This would allow the parent to refute any allegations
made against him or her in these proceedings. 28
This argument has, in turn, persuaded the legislature and judges
to allow for the softer confidentiality measures that have been
utilized.29 However, these softer confidentiality measures may have
an adverse effect in protecting the best interest of the children,
especially in achieving the goal of family reunification, 30 because of
the “emotional fallout or retaliation that might ensue if their
disclosures are revealed.” 31 Because the best interests of the children
should be at the forefront of both Article 6 and Article 10 proceedings,
identical measures of confidentiality should be applied in both
proceedings to truly maintain a child’s best interest.
This Note will argue that true and modified Lincoln hearings
should require identical confidentiality measures to protect the
children and their best interests while within the four walls of Family
Court for Article 6 and Article 10 proceedings. The matching
confidentiality procedures would protect a child’s best interest to the
fullest, outside of the Family Court, leading to an easier transition for
the custody and visitation arrangements in Article 6 proceedings and
expediting the ultimate goal of family reunification in Article 10
proceedings. 32
This Note will be divided into six sections. Section II of this
Note will discuss the transitional history of constitutional protections
guaranteed in criminal cases into civil proceedings. Specifically, it
will discuss the recognition of constitutional due process protections
for juveniles, the transition of viewing proceedings involving juveniles
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19.
CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19.
CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19.
Justin C., 903 N.Y.S.2d at 809-10.
Id. at 809-10
Id. at 806.
Sandra S. v. Abdul S., 914 N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Kings Cnty Fam. Ct. 2010).
Id. at 859.
Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 860, 861.
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more as civil in nature, and the further expansion of constitutional
protections in all civil cases. Section III will provide a discussion of
the Family Court System in New York. This section will define the
doctrine of parens patriae 33 by giving a brief background of the
doctrine. It will also address the creation of the Family Court Act in
New York, which will include a general overview of Article 6 and
Article 10 proceedings of the Family Court Act. Section IV will
analyze the procedures involved in Lincoln hearings with respect to
Article 6 and Article 10 of the New York Family Court Act. Section
V will argue that the full confidentiality utilized in true Lincoln
hearings should also be applied in “modified” Lincoln hearings to
protect the best interest of the child in both Article 6 and Article 10
proceedings, especially to achieve the ultimate goal of reunification of
the family in Article 10 most efficiently. Lastly, Section VI will
summarize the objective of this Note, which is for the Family Court to
implement identical measures of confidentiality for the best interest of
the child in Article 6 and Article 10 proceedings. Utilizing identical
confidentiality measures would alleviate tension in custody and
visitation arrangements in Article 6 proceedings and achieve
reunification of the family in Article 10 proceedings.
II.

HISTORY OF HOW CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS MADE ITS WAY
INTO CIVIL PROCEEDINGS.

It is well-settled law that, “Family Court Procedure is not
governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 34 In 1948, however,
the United States Supreme Court case, Haley v. State of Ohio, 35 was
pivotal in introducing criminal procedure with respect to due process
of law to matters pertaining to juveniles. 36 Furthermore, Haley first
recognized the necessity of criminal procedure in the juvenile arena by
adopting constitutionally protected rights previously afforded only to
adults. 37

33 “Parent of one’s country.” This provides a Court with authority to intervene to safeguard
individuals who are not able to do so on their own, especially children. LEGAL DICTIONARY,
https://legaldictionary.net/parens-patriae (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
34 In re D., 261 N.E.2d 627, 630 (N.Y. 1970).
35 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
36 Id. at 599.
37 Id. at 600, 601.
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A. The Beginnings of Constitutional Due Process
Protections for Juvenile Offenders
In Haley, fifteen-year-old John Harvey Haley was allegedly
serving as the lookout for two acquaintances that robbed and shot a
candy storeowner. 38 He was arrested five days after this incident
occurred. 39 Haley was convicted and sentenced to life in prison by the
Trial Court in Ohio, for first-degree murder of the storeowner. 40
During Haley’s arrest, police removed him from his house and took
him into custody to question him at the police station. 41 The police, by
five to six rotating officers, questioned Haley for approximately five
hours, between the hours of midnight and 5:00 a.m., without any
parent, attorney, or friend present. 42 At approximately 5:00 a.m.,
Haley confessed after being shown alleged confessions from his
accomplices. 43 Neither Haley’s mother nor the attorney Haley’s
mother retained to represent him was permitted to see Haley during the
questioning. 44 Haley gave a written confession on a form in which the
first line read, “We want to inform you of your constitutional rights,
the law gives you the right to make this statement or not as you see
fit.” 45
The Haley Court stated that the interrogation methods used to
obtain Haley’s confession did not conform to due process provided by
the Fourteenth Amendment. 46 Further, the Court reasoned that,
“Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods
which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law.” 47 In
other words, the police utilized tactics on Haley, “a child by means
which the law should not sanction,” 48 which would violate due process
if utilized on a similarly situated adult, and thus, Haley’s confession
cannot stand as it was not given voluntarily. 49

38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id. at 597.
Id.
Haley, 332 U.S. at 597.
Id.
Id. at 598.
Id.
Id. at 600.
Haley, 332 U.S. at 598.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 601.
Id.
Id.
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Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion averred, “I do not
believe that even capital offenses by boys of fifteen should be dealt
with according to the conventional criminal procedure.” 50 In other
words, Justice Frankfurter saw Haley as a vulnerable, helpless
adolescent who was not capable of withstanding the interrogation
methods that the police used against him like an adult could. 51 Justice
Frankfurter proferred that a young individual like Haley would
succumb to the stress during questioning and would be more likely to
give an involuntary confession regardless of his true guilt or innocence
in the matter. 52 Justice Frankfurter, along with the rest of the majority,
explained that Haley’s confession was not valid because of the lack of
due process protections provided to Haley during the questioning. 53
Thus, the Court effectively recognized that children and adults alike
must be afforded constitutional protections to avoid involuntary or
coerced confessions. 54 Even though the Supreme Court recognized
that it gives States the freedom to choose “their methods of criminal
procedure,” 55 the methods chosen cannot be in “conflict with deeply
rooted feelings of the community.” 56 Therefore, the Court reversed
Haley’s conviction because of the lack of constitutional due process
protections available to a teenager, like Haley, during a police
interrogation. 57
B. The Shift Towards Treating Juvenile Offender
Proceedings as Civil Matters
Juvenile delinquency proceedings after Haley started to be
viewed as more “civil in nature and not criminal” 58 because of the
Juvenile Court’s role as a parental figure or guardian to act in the best
interest of the children in its jurisdiction.59 Accordingly, juvenile
courts are expected to act in the best interest of the children and should
50

Haley, 332 U.S. at 602-03 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Id. at 603, 604.
52 Id. at 603.
53 Id. at 604-05.
54 Id. at 601.
55 Haley, 332 U.S. at 604.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 601.
58 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
59 Also known as the doctrine of parens patriae. LEGAL DICTIONARY, supra note 33; see
also Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-55.
51
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not simply “adjudicat[e] criminal conduct.” 60 However, the same
procedures should apply in the juvenile courts, as in adult criminal
courts, to ensure “due process and fair treatment for juveniles.” 61
In Kent v. United States, 62 fourteen-year-old Morris A. Kent,
Jr., was apprehended for a series of residential break-ins and attempted
thefts of handbags. 63 The Juvenile Court placed Kent on probation.64
Two years later, Kent (age sixteen), went into a woman’s residence in
the District of Columbia, stole her wallet and raped her. 65 These
offenses, while Kent was still on probation, consequently placed Kent
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. 66 However, the
Juvenile Court judge waived jurisdiction, without having conducted a
full investigation. 67 In addition, the judge denied Kent’s counsel
access to Kent’s social service file, which Kent’s counsel argued was
vital in providing Kent “with effective assistance of counsel.” 68
Ultimately, the judge turned Kent over to the District Court for the
District of Columbia, an adult criminal court. 69
Pursuant to the waiver provision of the District of Columbia
Juvenile Court Act, a “Petitioner [wa]s entitled to a hearing, including
access by his counsel to the social records and probation or similar
reports, which presumably are considered by the court, and to a
statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court’s decision.” 70 The Court
reasoned that these statutory requirements, which invoke
“constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of
counsel,” 71 are necessary. Furthermore, the hearing Kent was entitled
to does not have to include all criminal procedures expected in criminal
trials, but “must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment.” 72 The Court acknowledged that attorneys “have a
legitimate interest in the protection of the child,” 73 and the denial of
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Kent, 383 U.S. at 554.
Id. at 562.
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
Id. at 543.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kent, 383 U.S. at 546.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 557.
Id.
Kent, 383 U.S. at 562.
Id. at 546, 563.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/20

8

Kaufman: Protecting Subject Children

2017

PROTECTING SUBJECT CHILDREN

1197

access to a juvenile’s social service report and/or record is an
impediment to the effective assistance of legal counsel for a juvenile. 74
The emphasis on due process for juvenile delinquents,
specifically in New York, came into focus in the 1966 Court of
Appeals case, In re W. & S.. 75 In In re W., twelve-year-old Gregory
W. was taken into custody at approximately 5:30 p.m. for questioning
following a brutal assault in Brooklyn two weeks earlier. 76 Gregory
confessed to the assault after being questioned until approximately five
or six the following morning. 77 Throughout the questioning, Gregory
had very little sleep, did not have a lawyer, nor were his parents
present. 78 However, after Gregory was placed in Youth House, 79 the
interrogating police officer was informed that Gregory was confined
in the Kings County Hospital security ward at the time of the crime
Gregory confessed to committing. 80 Gregory was then questioned by
police, again without an attorney, about a possible escape from the
hospital; he initially denied escaping, but ultimately confessed. 81
During the trial in Family Court, Gregory’s treating
psychiatrist at the hospital testified. 82 Her testimony revealed that
Gregory was a schizophrenic and his diagnosis “[w]ouldn’t keep
[Gregory] from admitting to whatever he thought was expected so that
he could get out of the immediate situation.” 83 This court held that
Gregory, a “12-year-old mentally disturbed child detained in custody
for 24 hours with little or no sleep,” 84 provided a coerced confession
without proper due process protections; thus, Gregory’s confession
given under these circumstances cannot be valid. 85 Moreover, this
court recognized that juvenile delinquency proceedings are “quasi74

Id.
224 N.E.2d 102 (N.Y. 1966).
76 Id. at 103.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 104, 105.
79 Robert Daley, Youth House Acts to Drop Jail Aura, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 2 1964),
http://www.nytimes.com/1964/10/02/youth-house-acts-to-drop-jail-aura.html (“Youth House,
a private agency financed by city and state funds, holds juvenile offenders after arrest under
the jurisdiction of the Family Court. It is responsible for keeping the offender out of further
trouble, and for seeing that he gets back in court for his hearing.”).
80 In re W., 224 N.E.2d at 104.
81 Id. at 105.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 102.
85 In re W., 224 N.E.2d at 102.
75
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criminal in nature,” 86 because of the potential “loss of personal
freedom.” 87 The court reinforced a legislative committee report, which
provided that, “Any commitment––whether ‘civil’ or ‘criminal’,
whether assertedly for ‘punitive’ or ‘rehabilitative’ purposes––
involves a grave interference with personal liberty.” 88 Therefore, it
follows that a litigant, whose personal liberties are at stake, is entitled
to constitutional safeguards regardless of whether the proceeding is
criminal or civil in nature.
C. Greater Expansion of Constitutional Protections in All
Civil Proceedings
In 1967, after In re W., due process safeguards for juvenile
delinquents were expanded following the United States Supreme Court
case, In re Gault. 89 In Gault, fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault made
vulgar statements to a neighbor over the phone, and was subsequently
taken into custody. 90 The Arizona Juvenile Court consequently
committed Gerald to the State Industrial School as a juvenile
delinquent. 91 The Court in Gault described the confinement of Gerald
in the Industrial School as an incarceration, and therefore, a restraint
on his freedom. 92 The Court stated that, if Gerald were over eighteen
years old at the time of this offense, the sentence would carry a fine
and jail time, with a full gamut of constitutional protections guaranteed
to him throughout such a proceeding. 93 The Court followed its
reasoning from Kent by acknowledging the necessity for constitutional
due process in civil juvenile delinquency proceedings. 94 Gault held
that due process and fair treatment in juvenile delinquency proceedings

86

Id. at 106.
Id.
88 Id. at 106 (quoting Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization, Jan.
30, 1962, at 8.).
89 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
90 Id. at 4. Gerald was on probation for the theft of a wallet several months prior to this
incident. Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 27.
93 Id. at 29. Specifically, “The United States Constitution would guarantee him rights and
protections with respect to arrest, search, and seizure, and pretrial interrogation.” Gault, 387
U.S. at 29.
94 Id. at 30-31; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970) (“Civil labels and good
intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile
courts.”).
87
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include a juvenile’s “right to notice of charges, to counsel, to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and to [the] privilege
against self-incrimination.” 95
The Gault Court emphasized that “fair, efficient and effective
procedures” 96 are of great import to avoid “inadequate or inaccurate
findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy.” 97 These
procedures, according to the Court, “are our best instruments for the
distillation and evaluation of essential facts from the conflicting welter
of data that life and our adversary methods present.” 98 Further, the
truth is more likely to surface when a party has the ability to confront
the other about his version of the disputed incident. 99 In other words,
due process procedural safeguards are necessary to uncover the truth
or discover the fallacies by having the opportunity to either corroborate
statements presented in court or to refute the statements. 100 Thus,
because of the adversarial nature of a civil juvenile delinquent
proceeding, it follows that all parties in such a matter must be given
equal due process protections, whether an individual is a juvenile or an
adult.
Although due process in Family Court proceedings is required
to ensure fairness, a subject child’s interests must always be fully
protected, first and foremost. People ex rel. Fields v. Kaufmann101
recognized that the State, in its role as parens patriae, is allowed to
deviate from “strict adversary concepts” to maintain the “paramount

95

Gault, 387 U.S. at 2.
Id. at 18.
97 Id. at 20.
98 Id. at 21.
99 Id.
100 Gault, 387 U.S. at 21 (The Court opined that the mechanisms of due process assist in
uncovering the veracity of information provided in a given proceeding, especially the ability
to confront contradictory submissions.); see People ex rel. Fields v. Kaufmann, 193 N.Y.S.2d
789, 789 (1st Dep’t 1959). A family unit counselor as well as several mental health
professionals submitted confidential reports to a Family Court judge to determine which parent
would be awarded custody of the two subject children. Id. at 791. The trial court judge made
his determination for custody based on the record of the earlier Habeas Corpus hearing and
the confidential reports, which were not part of the record, nor were these reports made
available to the parents’ attorneys. Id. at 789. The Appellate Court concluded that the trial
court’s custody ruling was not proper based on the record lacking information from the
confidential reports, which would have allowed the parties to further inquire about the content
of said reports. Id. at 791. The Appellate court further stated, “the contents may provide the
source for the examination of the parties and witnesses by the Court and enable counsel to
fully dissect any disputed facts.” Fields, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
101 193 N.Y.S.2d 789, 789 (1st Dep’t 1959).
96
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welfare” of the child, which should trump the rights of the parents.102
The due process protections now recognized in civil juvenile
proceedings may and should be diminished if they conflict with the
best-interest-of-the-child principles that the Family Court should
always maintain as the top priority.
III.

THE FAMILY COURT SYSTEM IN NEW YORK
A. The Doctrine of Parens Patriae

Parens patriae is defined as “parent of the country,” 103 and
allows a State “to protect persons who are legally unable to act on their
own behalf.” 104 Specifically, in the United States, this has historically
encompassed “children, mentally ill persons, and other individuals
who are legally incompetent to manage their affairs.” 105 This doctrine
can be traced as far back as the old English common law system.106
Underlying this doctrine is the principle that a State, through its judges,
is obligated to “act as a superparent” to persons with a legal
disability. 107 Intertwined in the parens patriae doctrine is the bestinterests-of-the-individual principle, which imposes a duty on a State
to act “for the protection of the individual and then only in his or her
best interests.” 108 In Family Court especially, “the court has a duty to
insure that the best interests of children who have been placed in its
care are safeguarded.” 109 To accomplish this, a Court may be obligated
to interject to protect a child’s best interest when necessary. 110
B. Creation of the Family Court Act in New York
In New York, the Family Court Act, 111 which established the
Family Court itself, was implemented in 1962, and designed to handle

102

Id. at 792.
THE FREE DICTIONARY, LEGAL-DICTIONARY, by Farlex, Inc.,
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/parens+patriae (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Matter of Female S., 444 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (N.Y. County 1981).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 832.
110 LEGAL DICTIONARY, supra note 33.
111 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (Westlaw through 2017).
103
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all “familial dysfunction” within any given family. 112 In addition, the
New York Family Court “was created to be a special agency for the
care and protection of the young and the preservation of the family.”113
Full-time Law Professor at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law, Pace
University, Professor Merril Sobie, dedicates his professional studies
to children’s law and family law. 114 Professor Sobie “published the
official McKinney’s Commentaries to the Family Court Act and the
Domestic Relations Law.” 115
In his Practice Commentaries on the Family Court Act,
Professor Sobie provided that the “Family Court Act incorporates
largely substantive provisions, and only relatively skeletal procedural
framework.” 116 Professor Sobie proffered that the vernacular used to
describe the parties in Family Court proceedings “may seem to be a
superficial artifice designed to escape the quasi-criminal aspect of
some of the Court’s work.” 117 Moreover, Professor Sobie recognized
the “quasi-criminal” content heard in Family Court, but acknowledged
the minimal procedural posture of the Family Court. 118 Therefore,
procedure in Family Court is flexible and not as strict as true criminal
matters heard in criminal courts. 119 Despite the “skeletal procedural
framework,” Professor Sobie acknowledged that provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Law do apply in juvenile cases. 120 The adversarial
nature in criminal matters is also prevalent in juvenile matters,
particularly when dissolved couples with children are the litigants and
they have competing interests. The children’s best interest, however,
should remain the top priority, despite the adversarial nature of these
proceedings. 121

112 Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of N.Y. Book 29A, FAM.
CT. ACT § 111 (Westlaw through 2017, ch. 1-7) [hereinafter Sobie, Practice Commentaries §
111].
113 Matter of Female S., 44 N.Y.S.2d at 832 (quoting 1962 Report of Joint Legislative
Committee on court reorganization No. 2 F.C.A. Committee Comments at 2).
114 ELISABETH HAUB SCHOOL OF LAW PACE UNIVERSITY, http://law.pace.edu/faculty/merrilsobie (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
115 Id. In addition, Professor Sobie has authored and co-authored a plethora of books,
articles, studies, codes and commentaries all related to children’s and family law. Id.
116 Sobie, Practice Commentaries § 111, supra note 112.
117 Sobie, Practice Commentaries § 111, supra note 112.
118 Sobie, Practice Commentaries § 111, supra note 112.
119 Sobie, Practice Commentaries § 111, supra note 112.
120 Sobie, Practice Commentaries § 111, supra note 112.
121 Sobie, Practice Commentaries § 111, supra note 112.
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C. Article 6 of the Family Court Act
Section 651 of the Family Court Act provides the “Jurisdiction
over habeas corpus proceedings and petitions for custody and
visitation of minors.”122 Section 651 obtains its jurisdictional authority
from “Article 6, Section 13 of the New York State Constitution,”123
which provides, in relevant part, “The family court shall have
jurisdiction . . . over the custody of minors except for custody
incidental to actions and proceedings for marital separation, divorce,
annulment or marriage and dissolution of marriage.” 124 Professor
Sobie proffered that this “[s]ection is devoid of substantive or
procedural rules,” 125 and simply offers a broad best interests of the
child standard for general custody and visitation proceedings.126
Although best interest of the child has never been explicitly defined, it
often involves various factors a judge must assess with respect to what
and who would be around the child during his/her temporary
placement. 127 In New York specifically, a judge is required to make
his custody and visitation determination based on what will be best for
the child’s health and safety. 128 The only guidance on how to uphold
this standard in custody and visitation proceedings is through common
law, as there are no explicit procedural framework guidelines provided
in the Family Court Act. 129
D. Article 10 of the Family Court Act
Article 10 of the Family Court Act covers Child Protective
Proceedings. 130 Specifically, as stated in Section 1011, the purpose “is
designed to establish procedures to help protect children from injury
or mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and
emotional well-being.” 131 In addition, due process in Section 1011
122

N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 651 (West, Westlaw through L.2017, ch. 1-7).
Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y. Book 29A, FAM.
CT. ACT § 651 (Westlaw through 2017, ch. 1-7) [hereinafter Sobie, Section 651].
124 N.Y. CONST. art. 6, §13(b).
125 Sobie, Section 651, supra note 123.
126 Sobie, Section 651, supra note 123.
127 NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, https://www.nycourts.gov/courthelp/family/
bestInterest.shtml (last visited Jan. 12, 2017).
128 Id.
129 Sobie, Section 651, supra note 123.
130 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT, Art. 10 (West, Westlaw through L.2017, ch. 1-7).
131 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1011 (West, Westlaw through L.2017, ch. 1-7).
123
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provides that there might be instances when the Family Court may be
required to intervene and advocate for a child’s needs, even if a child’s
needs conflict with the desires of a parent. 132 Professor Sobie
acknowledged the lack of due process procedures contained in Article
10, but avers that a State’s intervention against a parent’s wishes for
her child “must be based on a due process of law.” 133 Section 1011
stresses the importance of protecting the child, and Professor Sobie
agrees with this premise. 134 Nevertheless, Family Court Lincoln
procedures in Article 6 and Article 10 proceedings vary drastically
with respect to maintaining the best interests of the child.
IV.

“TRUE” VS. “MODIFIED” LINCOLN HEARINGS

Despite the often-criticized lackadaisical Family Court
structure, profound, albeit conflicting, procedures are in place with
respect to subject children testifying. 135 Custody and Visitation
proceedings pursuant to Article 6 utilize an interview method called a
“true” Lincoln hearing, which provides full privacy and confidentiality
for the subject children testifying. 136 Conversely, “modified” Lincoln
hearings in Abuse and Neglect proceedings pursuant to Article 10 do
not offer the same levels of privacy and confidentiality to the subject
children who are testifying. 137 Family Court is expected to operate
under a best-interest-of-the-child jurisprudence, but it seems to do so
selectively and problematically. 138

132

Id.
Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y. Book 29A, FAM.
CT. ACT § 1011 (Westlaw through 2017, ch. 1-7) [hereinafter Sobie, Section 1011]; see U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV (“Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The interest of
parents in the care, custody and control of their children––is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”); Stanley v. State of Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972) (A parent has a fundamental right and interest in the “companionship, care,
custody and management of his or her children”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder.”).
134 Sobie, Section 1011, supra note 133.
135 CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19.
136 CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19.
137 CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19.
138 This is the author’s opinion on the inconsistent Lincoln procedure used in Article 6 vs.
Article 10 proceedings with respect to the privacy of the hearing and the confidentiality of the
hearing transcripts.
133
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In Custody and Visitation (Article 6) proceedings, the bestinterest-of-the-child jurisprudential approach is best exemplified in the
New York Court of Appeals seminal case, Lincoln v Lincoln.139
Lincoln involved a custody dispute between divorced parents. 140 The
Court was cognizant that the subject children’s “interests are
paramount” 141 and the “rights of their parents must, in the case of
conflict, yield to that superior demand.” 142 The Court also recognized
that “limited modifications of the traditional requirements of the
adversary system must be made, if necessary,” 143 in custody
proceedings, so long as it is for the benefit of the child. 144
To preserve the children’s best interest, the Lincoln Court
permitted a private interview with the subject children without the
parents or the parents’ counsel present. 145 The Court, in dicta,
proffered that, “It requires no great knowledge of child psychology to
recognize that a child, already suffering from the trauma of a broken
home, should not be placed in the position of having its relationship
with either parent further jeopardized by having to publicly relate its
difficulties with them,” 146 as well as, placing the children in the
precarious position of having to “openly choose between them.”147
The Court ultimately concluded that private interviews are more likely
to elicit accurate depictions from a child, while reducing the
psychological harms to a child, than if a child was to testify in the
conventional manner of open court. 148 Particularly, children will be
more inclined to “speak freely and candidly concerning their
preferences,” 149 regarding their parents and the children’s
“confidences would be respected,” 150 by not disclosing the testimony
offered during the private interview. 151

139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

247 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1969).
Id. at 660.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d at 660.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 660.
Id.
Id.
Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d at 661.
Id.
Id.
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Following the decision in Lincoln, these private in-camera
interviews between the children, the Attorney for the Child and the
presiding judge were subsequently referred to as Lincoln hearings. 152
A “true” Lincoln hearing can be held during or after a fact-finding
hearing because it is a tool used to corroborate any evidence introduced
during an Article 6 fact-finding hearing. 153 “True” Lincoln hearings
are conducted at the court’s discretion where it will be useful in
providing a court with insight into the subject children’s best
interests. 154
In determining whether a Lincoln hearing will be in the
children’s best interest, a court will typically look at the age of the
children, in addition to testimony made by others regarding the wishes
of the subject children. 155 With regard to a judge’s decision to conduct
a Lincoln hearing, one court proffered that, “These considerations
apply with equal force to children of all ages; indeed, it may be
particularly important to ensure that older children have the
opportunity to express their views in confidence, as their preferences
are given great weight in custody proceedings.” 156 Furthermore,
sealing the hearing transcript and not releasing it to the parents or the
parents’ counsel preserves the confidentiality of a “true” Lincoln
hearing. 157 This procedure is utilized to limit a parent’s access to the
transcript or its contents, and thus, not exposing a child to the potential
harm that could result from a parent finding out what his child said to
the judge. 158
Subsequent to Lincoln, Family Courts also began conducting
“modified” Lincoln hearings in Article 10 proceedings. 159 These
“modified” Lincoln hearings loosened the tight confidentiality reigns
afforded in “true” Lincoln hearings, 160 in which the child may incur
more harm than benefit. 161 A quintessential case describing a
“modified” Lincoln hearing is In re Justin C. 162 In Justin C., Petitioner
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19.
Spencer v. Spencer, 925 N.Y.S.2d 227, 229 (3d Dep’t 2011).
Angela F. v. Gail W., 879 N.Y.S.2d 426, 428 (3d Dep’t 2014).
Id.
Battin v. Battin, 12 N.Y.S.3d 672, 673 (3d Dep’t 2015).
Cohen v. Cohen, 993 N.Y.S.2d 4, 8 (1st Dep’t 2014).
Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19.
CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19.
Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
903 N.Y.S.2d 806.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017

17

Touro Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 [2017], Art. 20

1206

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33

alleged that the Respondents utilized corporal punishment on her
children and the father “had sexual intercourse with the daughter on at
least 20 occasions.” 163 The attorney for the subject daughter requested
a “modified” Lincoln hearing, before the start of the fact-finding
hearing to occur “in the presence of all counsel, but outside the
presence of respondents,” 164 with respondents’ attorneys having full
permission to cross-examine the daughter. 165
The subject daughter in Justin C. gave sworn testimony in front
of all counsel, the judge and a court stenographer, who compiled a
written transcript of the “modified” Lincoln hearing testimony. 166 The
Family Court sealed the daughter’s testimony transcript and marked it
as confidential prior to sending it to the Appellate Division, Third
Department, after the father appealed the finding of abuse and neglect
by the Family Court. 167 Father’s appellate counsel moved to unseal
the “modified” Lincoln hearing transcript asserting that the transcript
was necessary, “to reference and make fact-specific arguments based
upon that testimony.” 168 Father’s appellate counsel argued that
allowing the transcript to be left sealed “hampered her ability to
adequately represent the father on appeal.” 169 This motion was denied,
but was appealed again to the Third Department, which ultimately
vacated its prior decision and granted the father’s motion to unseal the
transcript of the daughter’s “modified” Lincoln hearing. 170 The Justin
C. court reasoned that it is baseless to extend the same confidentiality
safeguards to children in abuse and neglect cases as they are afforded
in custody proceedings. 171
This court held that the testimony transcript of a child during
an Article 10 proceeding, conducted in front of all counsel, with
163

Id. at 807.
Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Justin C., 903 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 808 (“While the issue at the fact-finding stage of a custody proceeding is what
custodial arrangement is in the best interest of the child, the issue at the fact-finding stage of
a Family Ct. Act article 10 proceeding is whether the petitioner has proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that the child is neglected and/or abused and that the respondent is responsible
for the neglect and/or abuse. Most significantly, unlike a custody proceeding, the position of
the allegedly neglected or abused child in an article 10 proceeding may be adverse to the
respondent.”).
164
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counsel having the opportunity to cross-examine the child, “may not
be sealed,” 172 because of the “fundamental due process concerns for
the purposes of an appeal.” 173 Having access to the child’s in camera
testimony affords the respondents’ counsel an opportunity to confirm
or discredit the statements made by the child. 174 Parents accused of
abuse or neglect invoke due process concerns because these
accusations could result in a limitation on their constitutionally
protected rights in the “companionship, care, custody and
management” 175 of their children. 176 Thus, natural parents’ protected
rights with respect to their children do not completely fall by the
wayside as some due process is afforded to them in abuse and neglect
proceedings. 177
However, this rationale is contrary to the best-interest-of-thechildren approach governing Family Court in Article 6 and Article 10
proceedings. Providing parents with access to their children’s private
interview transcripts can create significantly more turmoil within the
family. 178 Parents with access to the Lincoln hearing transcript would
be free to show anyone (other family members, friends, etc.) they want
what their children said about them. 179 It is possible that the family
member or friend and even the parent would view the children in a
negative light after having exposed what the children actually said

172

Justin C., 903 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
Id. at 809.
174 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
175 Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 at 651.
176 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
177 See In re B., 285 N.E.2d 288, 290 (1972). The New York Court of Appeals reasoned
that when a proceeding involves a natural parent’s constitutionally recognized interests in his
child, a parent is entitled to due process, fundamental fairness and equal protection safeguards
in the form of a “meaningful opportunity to be heard,” with the assistance of appointed legal
counsel. Id. at 290. The court further acknowledged the necessity for legal counsel in
proceedings, which could result in a natural parent losing “a child’s society . . . ,” and
becoming a ward of the State, by reasoning that counsel aid in closing the gap between the
state and pro se litigants with respect to the “inherent imbalance of experience and expertise.”
Id. Providing an indigent parent with counsel insulates a parent from being blind-sided by an
unfair proceeding lacking due process. Id. A lay parent may not have the expectations of due
process and fairness in proceedings like an experienced attorney would have, so it is essential
for a parent to be afforded legal assistance; see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 261 (West, Westlaw
through L.2017, ch. 1-7) (“Counsel is often indispensable to a practical realization of due
process of law and may be helpful to the court in making reasoned determinations of fact and
proper orders of disposition.”).
178 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
179 Id. at 862, 863.
173
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about that parent further damaging the relationship. 180 To guarantee
no further damage to an already strained parent-children relationship,
as well as to the children as individuals, sealing the Lincoln hearing
transcript as is required in Article 6 proceedings is the best practice. 181
This practice should take priority over the competing parents’ due
process concerns to uphold the best-interest-of-the-child foundation
that Family Court is built on.
V.

THE SAME LINCOLN PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED IN
ARTICLE 6 AND ARTICLE 10 PROCEEDINGS

The competing interests of the children’s best interest and the
parents’ due process rights between Article 6 and Article 10
proceedings result in conflicting Lincoln procedures. According to
Section 2:84 of the New York Practice Series––New York Family
Court Practice, 182 the constitutional right to confront one’s accuser
afforded to defendants in criminal matters is not applicable in Family
Court Article 10 proceedings. 183 However, the Family Court permits
respondent’s counsel to cross-examine the child witness without the
respondent parent present. 184 The Family Court seeks to “protect a
vulnerable child witness,” 185 and accomplishes this by eliminating the
child’s face-to-face confrontation with the respondent parent by using
modifed Lincoln procedure. 186 In fact, in Maryland v. Craig, 187 the
United States Supreme Court opined that a “State’s interest in the
psychological well-being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently
important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant’s right to
face his or her accusers in court.” 188 Disputes involving children and
their parents take the most significant toll on the children; thus, it is
vital that the children be afforded the greatest protection possible. 189

180

Id. at 863.
Sellen v. Wright, 645 N.Y.S.2d 346, 348 (3d Dep’t 1996).
182 10 MERRIL SOBIE & GARY S. SOLOMON, NEW YORK PRACTICE SERIES – NEW YORK
FAMILY COURT PRACTICE § 2:84 (Westlaw 2017 2d ed.) [hereinafter Sobie, Family Court
Practice].
183 Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182.
184 CALLAGHAN’S § 4:12, supra note 19.
185 Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182.
186 Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182.
187 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
188 Id. at 853.
189 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
181
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At the same time, Section 2:84 also acknowledges that
“excluding a respondent and his or her attorney becomes more
problematical when a child witness’s testimony constitutes both the
first detailed airing of the facts and the core of the petitioner’s case.” 190
In addition, Section 2:84 states that the respondent is not provided with
an opportunity to rebut this evidence when Lincoln procedure is
used. 191 Not having the opporunity to dispute the petitioner’s evidence
is especially prevalent if a judge’s finding is predicated only on
unsworn testimony. 192 Generally, a balancing test is applied to “weigh
the importance of face-to-face confrontation and the potential
prejudice to the respondent’s right to a fair hearing against the risk of
harm to the child.” 193 The inconsistencies in the Lincoln hearing
procedures utilized in Article 6 and Article 10 proceedings need to be
reconciled.
The Lincoln hearings in Article 6 proceedings are tools used to
“corroborate information acquired through testimonial or documentary
evidence adduced during the fact-finding hearing.” 194 On the other
hand, these “modified” Lincoln hearings utilized in Article 10
proceedings assist in proving “by a preponderance of the evidence that
the child is neglected and/or abused and that the respondent is
responsible for the neglect and/or abuse.” 195 Article 10 proceedings
appear to be more adversarial in nature. 196 In addition, Section 1046
of the Family Court Act of New York 197 provides an exception to the
hearsay rule of evidence, which admits a child’s prior hearsay
statements into evidence. 198 However, a child’s uncorroborated
hearsay statements alone are insufficient to find abuse or neglect at
fact-finding. 199
These allegations of abuse or neglect asserted against one party
provide that fairness in procedure and due process offers the accused

190

Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182.
Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182.
192 Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182.
193 Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182.
194 Spencer, 925 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
195 Justin C., 903 N.Y.S.2d at 808.
196 Id. at 810.
197 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046 (Westlaw through L.2017, ch. 1-8).
198 Merril Sobie, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y. Book 29A, FAM.
CT. ACT § 1011 (Westlaw through 2017, ch. 1-7).
199 § 1046(a)(vi) (Westlaw).
191
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party, through counsel, an opportunity to discredit the allegations. 200
In effect, the judge will then have the opportunity to determine whether
the testimony has been sufficiently corroborated for a finding to be
made. 201 However, sufficient corroboration of a child’s hearsay
statement can be accomplished through respondent’s counsel having
“an opportunity to submit questions to be posed by the judge,”202
through expert testimony, 203 other third party testimony, 204 or through
the child’s own in camera testimony. 205
In Matter of Nicole V., 206 the court concluded that, “[D]ue
process requirements are met by permitting a finding of abuse to be
made on the basis of a child’s out-of-court statement which is
corroborated by any competent, non-hearsay, relevant evidence
which . . . enhances the credibility of the child’s statements as to its
material elements.” 207 Furthermore, “any other evidence tending to
support the reliability of the previous statements,” 208 such as any
“writing, record or photograph . . . made as a memorandum or record
of any . . . event relating to . . . abuse or neglect,” 209 is sufficient to
corroborate a child’s hearsay statements. 210 At the same time, the
“testimony of the child shall not be necessary to make a fact-finding of
abuse or neglect,” 211 and corroboration is only required as evidence to
the credibility of a child’s hearsay statement. 212 The court in Nicole V.
200

Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
Id. at 862-63.
202 Sobie, Family Court Practice, supra note 182.
203 Matter of Victoria K., 650 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391-92 (3d Dep’t 1996) (“The therapist, who
is a specialist in the field of child sexual abuse cases, testified that in her opinion, based on her
interviews with the child and respondent, sexual abuse had occurred. She testified that the
child was spontaneous in her statements, suggesting that they were not rehearsed, and that the
specific and consistent sexual detail that the child was able to articulate was strong evidence
to support the child’s allegations.”).
204 In re Sabrina M., 775 N.Y.S.2d 96, 98 (3d Dep’t 2004) (“Sabrina’s out-of-court oral and
written statements were corroborated in key respects by the mother’s testimony, as well as the
testimony of third parties regarding hearsay statements made by Ashley, the mother and
respondent.”).
205 In re Aaliyah B., 892 N.Y.S.2d 242, 243 (3d Dep’t 2009) (“Here, the child’s allegations
of the sexual abuse were sufficiently corroborated by her sworn in-camera testimony detailing
certain incidents of when, where and how the sexual abuse occurred.”).
206 510 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1st Dep’t 1987), aff’d, 71 N.Y.2d 112 (1987).
207 Id. at 572-73.
208 § 1046(a)(vi) (Westlaw).
209 Id. § 1046 (a)(iv).
210 Id. § 1046 (a)(vi).
211 Id.
212 Matter of Nicole V., 510 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
201
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proffered that the principal objective in Article 10 proceedings is to
prevent further harm to physically and emotionally abused or
neglected child victims. 213 Because a child is not required to testify in
Article 10 proceedings, assurances of full confidentiality protections
should be given to incentivize a child if he or she so chooses to
testify. 214 Continuing to utilize the current “modified” Lincoln
procedure in Article 10 proceedings is contrary to the objectives of
protecting a child from further damage. 215 The rights of parents should
be secondary and outweighed by the rights of children when they are
competing, like they are in Article 10 proceedings. 216
The argument regarding the need for the softer confidentiality
measures in Article 10 Lincoln hearings because of natural parents’
due process and constitutional rights in raising their children should
not carry as much weight as it is presently afforded. 217 For example,
an in camera inquiry was conducted in People v. Darden, 218 a New
York Court of Appeals criminal case governed by the Criminal
Procedure Law and where constitutional protections are most
prevalent. 219 The Darden Court conducted an in camera inquiry for a
confidential informant whose identity was better kept anonymous. 220
During this in camera inquiry, the judge instructed the parties that the
“prosecutor may be present but not the defendant or his counsel.” 221 In
addition, the judge allowed defense counsel to submit a list of
questions for the judge to ask the confidential informant on the
defendant’s behalf. 222
Although the judge distributed a summary report of the
informant’s testimony to both parties, the judge was significantly more
213

Id. at 572.
Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 860.
217 The Sandra Court stated, “A Parent in an Article 6 custody case has a no less significant
due process right to know and meet the factual evidence that will determine his or her
constitutionally protected right to the care and custody of his or her child.” Sandra S., 914
N.Y.S.2d at 862. Despite this fundamental right of a parent, courts keep the Article 6 Lincoln
hearing transcripts sealed. Id. at 861. It follows then that because the Sandra court is
recognizing the significance of the parental rights in both Article 6 and Article 10 proceedings,
the permissible Lincoln procedures in Article 6 should be applied in Article 10 proceedings as
well. Id. at 862, 863.
218 313 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1974).
219 Id. at 52.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
214
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concerned with keeping the identity of the informant anonymous to
further protect effective law enforcement than it was in not disclosing
the informant’s statements. 223 The in camera in the case did not
implicate any due process or fairness violations. 224 An in camera, with
defense counsel absent, where the transcript is sealed was utilized in a
criminal case, which requires a higher burden of proof, 225 and was
found not to violate constitutional protections. 226 It should follow then
that the same in camera procedure, minus the summary report of the
testimony that was distributed in Darden, can be implemented in a
civil, Article 10 proceeding, which requires a lower burden of proof. 227
More importantly, utilizing the confidentiality standards seen
in Article 6 proceedings and in Darden are necessary in Article 10
proceedings to maximize protection of the subject children, which will
prevent further psychological and emotional damage. As previously
mentioned, the Lincoln court recognized that it is essentially common
sense to be aware of the potential harm to an already strained parentchild relationship if that same child is forced to openly disclose the
issues surrounding the relationship. 228 In a blog post written by
Rebecca Decoster, 229 she affirmed, “Testifying in court is stressful for
adults, more so for a child. Cross-examination can be brutal. The
negative psychological impact of testifying against a parent in an
emotionally-charged courtroom cannot be measured.” 230
Allowing a child’s private Lincoln hearing transcript to be left
unsealed could have the same psychological effect, as the parent would
be free to view the content of the transcript and share that transcript for
anyone’s viewing pleasure. 231 This can compound the trauma to

223

Darden, 313 N.E.2d at 52.
Id.
225 CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/burden_of_proof
(last visited Feb. 18, 2017) (providing that the burden of proof in criminal cases is on the
prosecution to establish the fact of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt).
226 Darden, 313 N.E. 2d at 52.
227 § 1046(b)(i) (Westlaw) (“[A]ny determination that the child is an abused or neglected
child must be based on a preponderance of evidence,” during a fact-finding hearing).
228 Lincoln, 247 N.E.2d at 660.
229 Rebecca Decoster is a former associate attorney in Varnum, LLP, in Michigan, and a
current referee with Oakland County Friend of the Court.
230 Rebecca Decoster, Kids on the Hot Seat: Child Witnesses in Divorce, VARNUM LAW
(Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.varnumlaw.com/blogs/varnum-etc/kid-on-the-hot-seat-childwitnesses-in-divorce.
231 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
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children. 232 It can have significant adverse effects on any and
potentially all familial relationships the children have, such as
grandparents, aunts and uncles on both the maternal and paternal sides
of the family. 233 Judge J. Dean Lewis, the March 2007 editor of The
Judge’s Page Newsletter, 234 wrote, “The life of each child who has
suffered abuse or neglect is critically affected by both the incident itself
and the response of those who intervene.” 235 Reunification of a family
will not occur if it may result in the child being “retraumatized.” 236
Sarah Kroll, 237 an attorney for the Children’s Law Center in
Denver, Colorado, explained re-traumatization as “feelings that the
traumatizing event . . . is happening to them again.” 238 Further,
children may suffer long-term, both physically and mentally, from the
initial traumatic incident and any subsequent re-traumatization. 239 It
would be difficult for children, in a situation like this, to live
comfortably and easily under the same roof as the parent who caused
the original trauma. 240 Whether it is a custody and visitation matter or
an abuse and neglect matter, a presiding judge may issue an order
removing the children from the home and placing them in the custody

232

Id. at 863.
Id.
234 Judge J. Dean Lewis, The Judges’ Page Newsletter, COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL
ADVOCATES FOR CHILDREN, (Mar. 2007), http://www.casaforchildren.org/atf/cf/%7B992
8CF18-EDE9-4AEB-9B1B-3FAA416A6C7B%7D/0702_children_and_youth_ involved_ in
_ the_court_experience_issue_0119.pdf.
235 Id.
236 C.A. v. Indiana Department of Social Services, 15 N.E.3d 85, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
237 Sarah Kroll authored a 2015 article in Volume 35, Issue 3 of the Children’s Legal Rights
Journal, 35 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 258 (2015), while attending Loyola University of Chicago,
School of Law.
238 Sarah Kroll, Opposing Viewpoints: The Sixth Amendment and Child Witnesses, 35
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 258, 258 (2015).
239 Id.
240 Id. (“Making a child face their alleged attacker and answer questions about the traumatic
crime against them can cause further harm to them, making their experience and the abuse
against them that much worse.”); For example, it is common for the initial act of trauma to be
triggered by things such as, “places, people, experiences, changes to his or body that occurred
as a result of the trauma, or sensory stimuli that prompt memories of the original trauma.”
Barbara Ryan, Judge Cynthia Bashant & Deena Brooks, Protecting and Supporting Children
in the Child Welfare System and the Juvenile Court, 57 JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT
JOURNAL, 61, 63 (Winter 2006) [hereinafter Ryan, Protecting and Supporting]. More
specifically, “Exposure to rooms similar to those in which the trauma occurred; Exposure to
sounds or smells that remind the child of the traumatic event; Exposure to voices or words
connected with the trauma for the child; and, Exposure to the perpetrator of the trauma.” Ryan,
Protecting and Supporting, supra note 240.
233
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of someone other than the natural parent. 241 It may be possible for
children, placed with a relative after removal, to experience trauma
reminders. 242 In particular, the “words connected to the trauma”
trigger may be pertinent if a parent gave access to a relative with whom
the children are temporarily placed. 243 For example, the relative could,
accidentally or on purpose, utter the traumatizing words in the
children’s presence, and thus, risk re-traumatization. 244 Moreover, the
trauma may be further compounded if the parent and other relatives
know what the children said to the judge about the parent during the
children’s Article 10 “modified” Lincoln hearing. 245
The Court of Appeals of Indiana, in C.A. v. Indiana
Department of Social Services, 246 characterized re-traumatization as “a
very negative thing because the more repeated trauma a child suffers,
the less likely they are to heal.” 247 This provides even more of a
justification to leave the transcript sealed so it does not end up in the
wrong person’s hands. Re-traumatizing children by a parent having
the ability to communicate the content of his children’s testimony to
other family members would significantly undermine children’s best
interests and would make the Article 10 goal of reunification
impossible. 248
VI.

CONCLUSION

Upholding constitutional protections, even in civil matters, is
undoubtedly of great import. 249 However, when upholding these
fundamental protections come at the expense of children, specifically
in Family Court where litigants do not have the same constitutional
protections as in criminal court, the protections must yield in favor of
the best interests of the children. 250 Family Court judges are expected

241 Tompkins County Court, The Family Court and You! (A Citizen’s Guide to the Family
Court), NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/
6jd/tompkins/family/you.shtml#top. (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
242 Ryan, Protecting and Supporting, supra note 240, at 63.
243 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 863.
246 15 N.E.3d 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
247 Id.
248 Sandra S., 914 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
249 See discussion supra Section II.C.
250 See discussion supra Section II.C.
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to protect the best interests of subject children both within the four
walls of their courtrooms, especially during the sensitive and
emotional proceedings of Article 6 and Article 10, and when the
subject children are outside of Family Court. 251
Lincoln hearings are conducted in both proceedings to protect
children’s best interests by preventing them from openly choosing
between their parents for Custody and Visitation and reliving the initial
traumatic experience by testifying in open court in Abuse and Neglect
proceedings. 252 It is ironic that, as it stands, the often more traumatic
experiences related to Abuse and Neglect (Article 10) matters receive
less strict protection when compared to the protections offered in
Custody and Visitation (Article 6) matters. 253 Accordingly, the strict
confidential Lincoln hearing procedures utilized in Article 6 matters,
namely both parents and their attorneys being prohibited from
participating in the hearing and the hearing transcript remaining sealed,
should be adopted in full for Article 10 proceedings. 254 This will
provide full protection for the subject children and guarantee that the
subject children will not be re-traumatized ensuring the children’s best
interests. 255
Therefore, the ultimate goal of protecting children and doing
what is in their best interests would be more attainable, and the risk of
re-traumatization to the children would be substantially reduced if all
stages of Article 10 proceedings remain highly confidential tantamount
to the Article 6 proceedings. 256 This would ensure that the court acts
in the best interests of the children, and make family reunification in
Article 10 proceedings a realistic, absolute goal to be reached within
the twelve-month standard from the commencement of a
proceeding. 257

251
252
253
254
255
256
257

See discussion supra Section III.A.
See discussion supra Section IV.
See discussion supra Section IV.
See discussion supra Section V.
See discussion supra Section V.
See discussion supra Section V.
See discussion supra Sections I and V.
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